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1. Introduction 
The past few decades have witnessed a proliferation of ethnic conflicts and secessionist movements. 
Unlike in traditional warfare however, the number of civilian casualties is extremely high in ethnic 
conflicts and the psychological impact of these conflicts on the life of ethnic groups tends to be decisive. 
As such, ethnic conflict is one of the most destabilizing forces in the post-Cold War world and is a global 
political problem that needs to be addressed. The search for appropriate conflict resolution methods in 
multi-ethnic societies has become therefore an important issue and one of the prevailing challenges to 
international security in our time. Ethnic conflict resolution has been the subject of social scientific 
inquiry for some time, resulting in a growing body of literature. Among the various methods for 
terminating ethnic war, partition has arguably become an effective resolution strategy. This thesis aims 
to reveal the efficacy and usefulness of ethnic partition as a possible solution to ethnic disputes. 
The international scholarship of ethnic conflict resolution is clearly divided along the question of 
whether partition can be considered as an effective solution for ethnic conflicts. Much literature criticises 
partition because of its perceived effect on splintering states resulting in unviable rump and new states 
and of the human suffering caused by the planned population transfer. Some even argue that it is not 
only ineffective in resolving ethnic hatred but also has a transforming effect on domestic civil wars into 
international conflicts. Notwithstanding these lines of criticism, proponents of the ethnic partition argue 
that it can indeed provide a successful option to end an ethnically-motivated conflict if certain conditions 
are met. Partition theorists argue that if the new boundaries are defensible and the costs of aggression 
are increased, ethnic tension at inter-state level will be eased after partition. Moreover, partition 
completely separates the groups at war in the new state, and together with preferably planned population 
exchange, leads the decline of ethnic tension and avoids the recurrence of war. Finally, partition 
advocates also highlight that once trust has been lost between the conflicting groups as a result of high 
scale of violence and atrocities, ethnic identities become tight and the chance for further peaceful 
coexistence diminishes. 
Given these viewpoints, the key research question of this thesis attempts to assess the effect of 
partition on the level of ethnic tension both in the relation between the rump and new state, and within 
the newly created, independent state. This research will examine the above-mentioned assumptions in 
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the case of Kosovo. Therefore the case study is aiming to answer whether the ethnic tension between 
the Albanian and Serbian ethnic groups has decreased in the post-partition period after the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in 1999. This study will provide empirical support for the 
theoretical assumptions at inter-state level in regard to the redrawing of international borders. It will also 
highlight the importance of dividing the belligerent ethnic groups in easing the ethnic tension and 
reducing the likelihood of the reescalation of violence. Furthermore, it will assess the significance of 
establishing defensible borders that arguably prevent the parties from resorting to high-scale violence, 
avoiding a violent revenge and ethnic cleansing and ensuring the return of the Kosovo Albanian 
refugees. The high degree of homogeneity and the establishment of parallel administrative structures 
explain the reduced need for cooperation and the reduced incentive for violence. It will be demonstrated 
that the incomplete separation between the ethnic groups, especially the division at the Ibar/Ibër River, 
has led to sporadic outbreaks and a feeling of insecurity and mistrust for the locals. The localisation and 
frequency of ethnically-motivated crimes will shed light on the correlation between ethnic heterogeneity 
and ethnic mistrust in the post-partition state, further supporting the impact of homogeneity on reducing 
ethnic tension. Finally, the gradual level of participation of the southern Serbs in general and in 
municipal elections and all spheres of life in an independent Kosovo is illustrative of decreased ethnic 
tension. 
Without doubt, the case of Kosovo is suitable and relevant for investigating the effects of partition. 
It is a widely discussed topic and still a controversial one if we consider the basic principle of self-
determination on which the declaration of independence of Kosovo is based. The tragic events of the 
1998-99 war divided the world powers for proponents of the intervention on behalf of Kosovo Albanians 
and defenders of state sovereignty in support of the territorial integrity of Serbia (Wolff and Peen Rodt 
2013, 815-16). Finally, the US and the Western powers intervened in order to prevent the escalation of 
the violence, similar in scale to the Bosnian crisis, but disregarded the principle of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of Serbia (Nikolić 2003, 64). The intervention with the largely debated United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244, however, only put an end to the killings and not to 
the territorial disputes between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbians. Not surprisingly, the resolution of 
the conflict has been interpreted differently by the two groups. The Kosovo Albanians claim that it 
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declares their right for independence while the Serbians consider it as the basis of their right to territorial 
sovereignty over Kosovo (Burema 2013, 49). Apart from this obvious controversy, many issues have 
remained unsolved concerning ethnic mistrust, local autonomy and so forth. The last fifteen years have 
also demonstrated the division among the stay-behind minority communities. Serb ethnic groups in the 
southern provinces of Kosovo seem to reconcile themselves with the situation while the Serbian minority 
in the northern districts still claim their reintegration to Serbia and reject the independence of Kosovo. 
Nonetheless, the recent agreement of the European Union (EU) -facilitated dialogue has led to some 
evident progress that future research shall investigate. 
Obviously, this research has some limitations. As it examines a case study with distinctive features, 
conclusions may not indicate a universal explanation for the causal relationship between partition and 
ethnic tension. It is also beyond the scope of this study to examine the case of other minority groups 
within Kosovo, such as Ashkali, Bosniaks, Goranis, Egypts, Romas and Turks. This exclusion is 
explained, however, by their relatively low proportion of the total population that is altogether around 
3%. Furthermore, it is without doubt that the recent history of the territory mostly relates to the co-
existence of the Albanian and Serbian communities.  
In addressing the aforementioned research question, the thesis proceeds as follows. It will first assess 
the comprehensive scholarship on ethnic conflict resolution and provide an overview of the main 
assumptions of partition advocates. On the basis of these findings, the main conditions for the success 
and usefulness of partition will be discussed. This section on theoretical framework aims to expose the 
effect of partition at inter-state and intra-state levels. Section three is concerned with the methods of this 
research and the main indicators for successful partition. The third chapter unveils the historical 
background of the ethnic tension between the Serbian and Albanian communities up to the 1998-99 war. 
The subsequent two sections will present the main empirical findings of the research and will conclude 
the impact of partition on ethnic tension following the NATO intervention and up to most recently.  
Before concluding this introductory part, the terminology must be clarified as it may provide 
confusion due to the highly sensible nature of the topic. Both the Albanian and Serbian scholarships 
have their own expression for Kosovo. Albanians solely use “Kosova” for the territory whereas Serbian 
tends to call it “Kosmet”, originating from their previous province of Kosovo and Metohija which means 
4 
 
monastic lands (Judah 2008, 30). The latter name is widely refused, however, by the local Albanian 
population as it links the territory to the Serbian Orthodox Church and its past as a part of Serbia. Despite 
the fact that 108 out of the 193 members of the United Nations has so far recognised the independence 
of the Republic of Kosovo, there are still reservations as regards the name of the state: it is widely 
referred to as Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo 2014). 
Nevertheless, throughout the thesis I will refer to the territory as “Kosovo”, opting for the English 
denomination as the most neutral form of the name describing the southern region previously held by 
Serbia. In addition, I will use the spelling of the related majority group for the names of cities and 
provinces, in line with the official formula at reports of international organisations. In addition, this 
study will refer to the term of Serbia and Serbian instead of using names of the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro and its resident. These denominations will hopefully enable the 
reader to more easily follow the main arguments and findings of the study. 
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2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
The first part of the thesis covers conceptualisation to make each concept in this thesis, clear. This is 
followed by a review of the scholarship on ethnic conflict management and resolution which reveal the 
most important criteria for assessing partition as a solution for conflict resolution. Since the thesis 
focuses on partition, the first chapter will clarify the distinction between conflict management and 
conflict termination methods. Partition might be a solution of ethnic conflicts, or more precisely be a 
termination method that aims to end ethnic tensions among conflicting parties. The second part of the 
literature review introduces the core set of arguments of the scholarships that will be organised according 
to a two-level criteria system. It delineates a two-level criteria system that is built upon the main 
arguments proposing partition as a solution for ethnic conflicts and address different relations of the 
conflicting parties.  
 
2.1. Definitions 
In order to provide scientifically sound findings for my research question, I will first look at how the 
scholarship on ethnic conflicts defines and uses some crucial concepts and terms that serve as the basis 
of my thesis. 
The first concept to look at is ethnic conflict. This notion originates from certain ideological currents 
about norms of equality and competition. The spread of these ideas created an environment in the post-
colonial era in which subordinated groups felt illegitimate that others who lived close by had power over 
them. In this regard, as Horowitz (1985, 5) claims, the main goal of ethnic conflicts is “control of the 
state, control of a state, and exemption from control by others”. These universal and uniform elements 
make the character of the conflicts pervasive and groups or movements adopt similar claims of equality 
on a collective basis. This is not to say that ethnicity is a cause of conflict, there are numerous examples 
for ethnic groups living together peacefully. When ethnic groups face social uncertainty and fear in 
terms of assimilation or for their physical safety and survival in the future, however, ethnicity becomes 
“one of the major fault line along which societies fracture” (Newland 1993 cited in Lake and Rothchild 
1996, 8). In other words, the politicization of the distinctive characteristics of an ethnic group is a feature 
of an ethnic conflict (Johnson 2008, 145). Overall, an ethnic conflict describes a confrontation as regards 
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ethnic distinctions and comprises at least one group expressing its goals and dissatisfaction exclusively 
with ethnic terms. This party perceives a discriminating ethnic division that constrains its members to 
realise their interests and to have the same rights as the members of other conflicting group(s) (Cordell 
and Wolff 2010, 4).  
Ethnic conflicts, thus, have a peculiar feature and are particularly limited in possibilities to spill over 
the state borders. Ethnic conflicts are unlikely to cause global conflict but there is a possibility for 
diffusive or escalating effects. The former effect occurs when the tension increases the possibility of 
spreading the conflict into a second state where groups face similar political conditions, while the latter 
when foreign actors get involved in the internal conflict of the state. In contrast, ideological conflicts 
are more universal in terms of principles and even capable of causing global unrest (Lake and Rothchild 
1996, 18-9). Identity-based conflicts have common characteristics as regards the lack of consensus over 
unity whereas an ideology-based conflict only relates to conflicting groups who have different ideas on 
which ideology to choose as the basis of governing the unified state (Christie 1992, 69). While ideology-
based conflicts do not distinguish people according to their loyalty to an ethnic group, identity-based 
conflicts do separate the population in this way (Johnson 2008, 145). Moreover, ethnic conflict might 
be accompanied by ethnic cleansing that aims to consolidate the group’s power over a territory and 
generally involves harassment, destruction of property, deportations, and murders with the overall aim 
of total population expulsion of the “undesirables” (Walling 2000, 49).  
The next two terms to consider are secession and partition. Secession is a “special species of ethnic 
conflict” which has a distinctive territorial character (Horowitz 1985, 230). Secessionist movements 
may develop after years of conflict or as early as a new state is founded. It must be also differentiated 
from irredentism: secession is an effort by an ethnic group to declare authority over a territory where 
they are residing but that is part of the common state. Irredentism on the other hand, is a movement by 
an ethnic group within a state aiming at enlarging its own authority over a territory across borders in 
which the same ethnic group is located at the costs of the neighbouring states (Horowitz 1992, 119; 
Wolff 2006, 45). If secession reaches its goal it results in a new state by the “unilateral action of a 
rebellious ethnic group” (Kaufmann 1998, 125; Downes 2001, 84). From another point of view, 
separatism differs from secession because it refers to the separation of a region within an existing state 
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without aiming to create an independent state. It is important to note, however, that the two terms are 
interchangeable since the demands of ethnic groups may shift between autonomy and independence in 
light of the negotiations (Horowitz 1985, 232). 
The phenomenon of partition encompasses the separation of ethnic groups into different 
independent states, the transformation of former internal boundaries into international ones and the 
division of the existing state into multiple parts. It results in a rump state which proceeds with the 
institutions of the pre-partitioned common-state and creates one or more new successor states by 
agreement among the conflicting parties or by a third party imposed rule (Chapman and Roeder 2007, 
678; Downes 2001, 84; Pischedda 2008, 103). It also involves “jointly decided” separations by the 
responsible powers, either agreed between the two sides or imposed on both sides (Kaufmann 1998, 
125). Horowitz (1985) proposes partition as a solution only for otherwise unresolvable ethnic conflicts. 
Accordingly, partition should as a “radical surgery” separate territorially concentrated antagonist ethnic 
groups into more than one homogenous state (Horowitz 1985, 589). Similarly, others argue that partition 
provides a pre-emptive solution when there is “no belief, no trust, and no passion for a new start” 
between ethnic groups (Tullberg and Tullberg 1997, 245). Therefore, partition may resolve ethnic 
conflicts by dividing a multi-ethnic and unified state, given that liberal democratic institutions work 
(McGarry and O’Leary 1993, 11). On a slightly different note, Kaufmann (1996) argues that the main 
goal of partition should be lasting safety instead of perfect peace. Partition should provide safety in 
terms of freedom from any threats of ethnic murder or expropriation for the majority of the ethnic 
groups. In addition, he determines that lasting safety may entail some degree of violent acts although it 
does not result in as much loss and suffering as ethnic cleansing (Kaufmann 1996, 151). 
Although scholars often use the terms partition and secession interchangeably this thesis will solely 
use the term partition (McGarry and O’Leary 1993; Tir 2002, 2003). Nonetheless, the overall 
phenomenon of partition requires further details for my research. Kaufmann underlines that independent 
sovereignty is secondary to separation because partition without separation does not cease incentive for 
further violence. De facto partition can eliminate a security threat if it separates the conflicting parties 
into homogeneous regions with regional self-defence capability and local autonomy (Kaufmann 1996, 
137, 162). De facto differs from de jure partition in that the former separates opposing ethnic groups 
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within the same state, while de jure partition divides them into internationally recognised sovereign 
states (Pischedda 2008, 104; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009, 84). The formal statehood makes it 
possible to form alliances with other states that helps to balance power among the rump and the newly 
independent state thus likely preventing subsequent revisionist conflicts by the larger post-partition state 
(Downes 2001, 77).  However, the de jure partition settled by intervention might have a contagion effect 
for other movements since international recognition of the statehood entails access to development 
assistance, international organisations, and several more privileges by international law for an ethnic 
group. Therefore, since there is no support for the perception that there is a difference between the 
effectiveness of the two types of conflict termination methods, Pischedda (2008, 117) argues that the de 
facto partition is preferable to de jure partition at preventing further conflicts.   
These differentiations are of utmost importance as my thesis will discuss the case of Kosovo that 
became a de facto partitioned territory following an international intervention in 1999, but has been 
seeking de jure recognition of statehood since its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. This 
process is slow, however, and still only a little more than half of the United Nations (UN) member states 
recognise its status (Kosovo Foreign Ministry 2014). 
Given the division among the relevant scholarship concerning the importance of territorial 
separation of ethnic groups, my thesis finally clarifies the notion of homogeneity. Some scholars argue 
that partition shall separate ethnic groups into different states to stop and prevent further conflicts 
(Downes 2001, 2004; Mearsheimer 1993, 2000; Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1999). However, 
Kaufmann (1996, 162) suggests that partition is likely to leave some minorities on both sides of the 
border and ethnic purity is not necessary if the enclaves are small and so weak militarily that it does not 
propose military threat or incentives for irredentism. Johnson (2008) set up an index to measure whether 
the stability of post-partition peace depends on the separation of the conflicting ethnic groups. His 
findings suggest the importance of homogeneity by illustrating that “the higher the ethnodemographic 
separation, the less likely war [or low-level violence] will recur within the first two [to five] years” 
(Johnson 2008, 160). 
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2.2. Literature review on ethnic conflict resolution 
Having reviewed the main definitions and concepts of ethnic conflict resolution, this section establishes 
my hypothesis. It first looks at the scholarship on ethnic conflict resolution and the different types of 
methods involved. The scholarship is divided on the efficacy of partition in terms of easing ethnic 
tension. While some insist that partition decreases violence in post-partitioned states, others argue the 
flaws of partition exceed the benefits and also doubt the results because of weak empirical results and 
selection bias.  
McGarry and O’Leary (1993) classify ethnic conflict regulation by the modes of conflict termination 
and management methods. Their taxonomy aims at revealing posteriori the “laws of motion” which 
govern the ethnic conflict regulation and makes a distinction between methods that seeks to eliminate 
differences and those that propose to manage differences between conflicting parties (McGarry and 
O’Leary 1993, 3). Their empirical “macro-methods” of eliminating ethnic differences contains 
genocide, forced mass-population transfers1, partition or secession, and integration or assimilation. 
While the methods for managing differences cover hegemonic control, arbitration, cantonisation or 
federalisation, and consociationalism or power-sharing (McGarry and O’Leary 1993, 4). 
Schneckener (2004) differentiates methods of elimination, control, and recognition by a normative 
judgement of acceptable and unacceptable policies to resolve ethnic conflicts. He puts genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, and forced assimilation in the elimination method and places coercive domination, co-opted 
rule, and limited self-rule into the control regime category. Contrary to these two unacceptable 
approaches, he claims the policies of the third category, recognition, superior in terms of morality and 
efficiency. Methods of recognition includes minority rights, power-sharing, territorial solutions, and bi-
multilateral regimes. However, these policies require consensus; ethnic groups in a particular territory 
thus need to come to an agreement with the state from which they separate about the criteria and 
conditions of their independence (Schneckener 2004, 18-39).  
Eliminating methods such as genocide and ethnic cleansing have poor records of reducing ethnic 
tension. Ethnic cleansing, conducted as expelling and exchanging population, had been a favoured 
                                                 
1 Forced mass population transfer based on ethnic criteria refers to concept of ethnic cleansing that was popularised 
by the Western journalists during the violent breakup of the Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Walling 2000, 49). 
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strategy for ensuring internal stability and external security prior to the end of Cold War. In the 
subsequent period, however, the international community tended to universally condemn the use of this 
method, primarily to prevent such a high level of human suffering (Wolff 2006, 141). However, 
according to McGarry and O’Leary (1993), elimination methods also include partition or secession and 
that conflict resolution methods belongs to the acceptable recognition policies of Schneckener (2004). 
This suggests that partition as termination method is worth considering as a resolution for ethnic 
conflicts. Other methods of ethnic conflict resolution would also pose interesting issues of inquiry, but 
they are nonetheless outside the scope of this study. The thesis will therefore not analyse the practical 
application and the extent of success and failures of different policies of conflict management and 
resolution. Essentially, the focus will be on one particular form of territorial solution: ethnic partition. 
The advocates of partition argue that it should be considered as a policy or solution to end ethnic 
conflicts in particular cases. Downes (2001) argues that partition decreases the post-partition violence 
if the partition is properly planned and imposes new borders in way of separating the territorially 
heterogeneous population. Thus, partition needs to embrace separation, independence, and a balance of 
power and defensible borders which raise the cost of aggression and thus deter either party from further 
violence (Downes 2001, 60-4). In addition, an international as compared to an internal conflict between 
these states receives higher attention and puts pressure on the stakeholders to find solution (Johnson 
2008, 151). 
This is, however, not to say that the immediate cessation of ethnic tension can be expected. Since 
ethnic identity plays a crucial role in ethnic conflicts, individuals become targets because of their ties. 
Unless physically separating the ethnic groups, the persistent need for interethnic cooperation may risk 
continued violence (Kaufmann 1998, 122). Some argue that even though the integrity of the states is 
superior, these state-centred legal norms may be worth reconsideration in case of ethnic wars. If the 
conflicting parties are not separated, the human consequences may be higher compared to the short and 
long-term legal costs of ethnic separation (Kaufmann 1996, 170). Yet, the other findings imply that 
partition is a useful conflict termination method despite the fact that it does not necessarily eliminate the 
conflict completely. The frequency of ethnic conflicts following partition may not decrease but their 
severity is arguably lower than it would be during a prolonged war (Tir 2002, 281).  
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Numerous scholars question partition as a conflict resolution method and doubt its efficacy in post-
partitioned states. Some highlight the deficiency of empirical results that are based on selected 
illustrative cases (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009, 82). However, one of the most essential 
differences between scholars advocating partition as a solution and those who contravene this approach 
is whether violence recurrence in post-partition countries is a failure of partition. Advocates of partition 
argue that this threshold is too low to doubt the efficacy of partition since a low amount of conflict is 
better than a war (Chapman and Roeder 2007; Kaufmann 1996; Tir 2002). On the other hand, there are 
counterarguments that claim that partition may be accompanied by significant violence extending from 
one country to another or replacing civil with interstate conflict (Fearon 2004, 405; Horowitz 1985, 
590). Some propose that these global trends do not suggest decreasing levels of violence following the 
territorial adjustments even in the case of physical separation of people (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 
2009, 85). Others object to partition for humanitarian reasons; the separation of populations causes 
human sufferings even if it is prepared in advance and it encourages the split of states which might lead 
to non-viable rump and new states. Besides, it does not stop ethnic antagonism since it only transforms 
domestic civil wars into international conflicts (Fearon 2004, 397). 
Others assert the preservation of multi-ethnic states and promote other solutions for ethnic conflicts 
because of the deficiencies of partition. They claim that ethnic identities may change and future 
cooperation between conflicting parties is possible. Consequently, various forms of power-sharing 
solutions such as federalism and regional autonomy are advocated by this approach providing self-
governance to territorial regions by institutions and some authority (Horowitz 1985, 601-28). Overall, 
some scholars contend partition in general since it seems to work only under limited set of conditions 
(Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009, 83). 
Having assessed the literature of ethnic conflict resolution in light of the likely effect partition has 
on ethnic tension within the new independent state and between the new and the rump states, it appears 
that partition provides a viable solution if it establishes new states by separating ethnic groups as much 
as possible. Furthermore it has no destabilizing effect in the regions in terms of being transformed into 
an international conflict. To incorporate these criteria of partition, the hypothesis of this thesis is as 
follows: 
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H: Partition decreases ethnic tension between the conflicting ethnic groups between the rump 
and the new state, and within the new state. 
 
To find support for this assumption, this thesis will analyse the partition of Kosovo. The next section 
will introduce the core arguments of the scholarship on partition as a territorial solution for ethnic 
conflicts. It also sets a two-level criterion that will guide my study. 
  
2.3. Theoretical framework for partition 
Having considered whether partition is a proper policy or solution to manage and ease ethnic conflicts, 
this thesis distinguishes two main sets of arguments in this section to underpin and debate the 
advantageous effect of partition. These points will be assessed at two levels: the inter-state and the intra-
state according to the main actors the dimension concern. 
The first dimension looks at the inter-state level regarding the relation between the rump and the 
new independent state following partition. According to the main propositions, the first set of arguments 
relates to the efficacy of partition as a conflict termination method by redrawing international boundaries 
(Downes 2001; Chapman and Roeder 2007; Tir 2003). This requires a few conditions to be met. First, 
the international boundary revision must be implemented properly by creating defensible borders in 
order to separate ethnic groups into sovereign states. Second, partition must result in newly created 
borders that are expected to increase the costs of aggression thus lowering the likelihood of the 
reescalation of the violence (Downes 2001, 63). Evidently, the new international borders only leave 
costly options for any violent action such as organising blockades, intervention, or warfare. Without 
doubt, the redrawing of international borders reduce the chance that conflicting parties reinitiate violence 
or disrupt peace by the above mentioned means (Chapman and Roeder 2007, 681). The findings of Tir 
(2003), based on the study of non-colonial territorial changes, further indicate that the majority of 
territorial changes accompanied by renewing the previous internal boundaries lead to “absence of future 
territorial conflict”. It must be also taken into account, however, that his study found evidence for high 
rates of violence in some cases. This necessitates the importance of settling each aspect of the territorial 
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disputes and if necessary revisioning the previous borderlines preventing future conflict (Tir 2003, 79). 
Reasonably long and defendable borders are necessary to satisfy the need of ethnic groups for a viable 
national territory thus preventing the reescalation of the high scale of violence (Mearsheimer and Van 
Evera 1999). 
The second set of arguments refers to the issue of separation and population transfer. Generally 
speaking, it may be essential to decrease the possibility of future territorial disputes.  As Kaufmann 
(1998, 155) points out, new international boundaries should not only offer defensible state borders but 
also separates the hostile populations. As such, separation provides a basis for lowering the possibility 
of reescalation of the conflict. In cases where ethnic separation is not complete, it creates stay-behind 
minorities in the territory of both emerging states. This failure to separate ethnic groups may enhance 
incentives for ethnic cleansing (Downes 2004; Johnson 2008; Tullberg and Tullberg 1997).  
Johnson (2006) perceives that redrawing borders rarely achieves ethnically homogenous states. 
Therefore partitioning to reduce the possibility of reescalation of violence should meet the requirements 
of already largely separated populations or willingness from the participation countries to conduct high 
volume population transfers (Johnson 2008, 165-66). Similarly, if the new borders relocate a significant 
number of members from one ethnic group into the territory of another ethnic group, only planned 
population transfers can prevent the recurrence of the previous conflict and save people from becoming 
refugees (Downes 2001, 63; Tullberg and Tullberg 1997). However population transfer may be justified 
and applied, only to save lives. Otherwise it is just an unnecessary instrument causing loss of homes and 
disrupting social, religious, and cultural relations (Kaufmann 1998, 121). Consequently, population 
transfers can be an integral part of the partition plan to prevent an ethnic group from being “compelled 
[from its homeland] to live elsewhere” (McGarry and O’Leary 1993, 9). Moreover, it eliminates 
cleansing or rescuing incentives on ethnic grounds (Kaufmann 1996, 150). Although partition is 
considered by some as “an ugly formula for ending war” since it divides communities and violates 
human rights, forcing groups of people to leave their properties behind, it can prevent deterioration of 
the situation (Mearsheimer 2000, 137). However, ethnic separation and planned people exchanges are 
necessary measures for partition (Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1999; Mearsheimer 2000). 
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Having looked at the main arguments for partition at inter-state level, this thesis assesses the case 
study of Kosovo firstly by the following criterion: 
(1) Partition decreases violence between the conflicting parties in relation to the rump and the 
new state due to the establishment of new defensible borders and properly separating ethnic 
groups into sovereign states. 
 
The second dimension involves the intra-state level that encompasses the analysis of the partition’s 
effect on ethnic tension within the new independent state. The dimension is based on the concept of 
security dilemma that must be elaborated from the point of view of the ethnic groups.  It involves the 
perceived threat of ethnic groups as regards their collective survival when a discriminatory policy of the 
central government denies access to those essential resources that could provide them a distinct identity 
as an ethnicity.  If an ethnic group lacks the physical, political, economic, social, and cultural security, 
it will conceive the conditions as a threat to its distinctive group identity and existence and become 
responsible for its own survival (Wolff 2006, 94). Since the security dilemma suggests that the more 
heterogeneous the population is, the more opportunities for attacks there are, an ethnic group starting a 
tactical military offence is advantageous. Political incitement magnifies these fears while the spiral of 
mistrust and mutual fears deepen the division and eventually may lead to violent attacks of one group 
by another. Partition in this case terminates the conflict by physically separating the ethnic groups and 
prevents any of the conflicting parties to resorting to tactical use of force. The security dilemma thus 
suggests that partition is the only viable solution for reducing the real security threat, preventing further 
escalation of violence and large-scale violent actions (Kaufmann 1996, 1998; Lake and Rothchild 1996; 
Posen 1993; Tir 2002).   
Firstly, partition must be followed by proper ethnic separation as this reduces the incentive and the 
opportunity for further violence. It reduces the likelihood of renewed high scale violence as it abolishes 
the need to cooperate and to trust in the other conflicting party (Downes 2001, 61-70). The newly created 
and defensible ethnic enclaves decrease violence even without independence as long as their local 
autonomy gives competence in protecting their key interests. However, partition without separation does 
not necessarily stop ethnic violence, indeed it may even increase it (Downes 2004; Kaufmann 1996, 
15 
 
137). Similarly, several authors argue that partitions only imposing new borders without properly 
planned ethnic separation are less likely to decrease the violence since territorial heterogeneity nourishes 
ethnic hatred (Christie 1992; Mearsheimer 1993). Other findings reveal that the degree of ethnic hostility 
is the most extensive where the population is the least separated (Downes 2004; Kaufmann 1998, 155). 
Likewise, the study of Pischedda (2008) on historical comparison of the effectiveness of power-sharing 
solutions and partition suggests that partition is a slightly more effective termination strategy.  However, 
even partition fails to prevent the recurrence of conflicts in the case of ethnically mixed territory.2  
Secondly, the effect of partition on ethnic antagonism and mistrust must be considered in light of 
that ethnic identity stem from the distinctive features of an ethnic group such as language, culture, and 
religion. These intra-group ties deepen during conflicting times when the division of the segments lies 
on their different ethnicity as a group that provides them safety and protection (Kaufmann 1996, 142). 
On the same note, violent conflicts envisage that further co-existence might be problematic among 
different ethnic groups. According to the study of Hodson, Sekulic, and Massey (2006) on the role of 
emotions in the Yugoslavian ethnic conflicts, the war has had a crucial role in the change of attitude 
among people with different ethnic background. Findings demonstrate that people perceive the members 
of other ethnic groups as “dangerous and untrustworthy” (Hodson, Sekulic, and Massey 2006, 821). 
The importance of ethnic identity increases when the elite strengthen these bonds and use the 
nationalism card to create a threatening enemy image about the opposition group. By providing true or 
invented tales of atrocities to the fear that evolved from previous fighting hatred is increased. Moreover, 
it aims at justifying the use of every means of violence for group members against their opponents 
(Downes 2001, 62; Kaufmann 1996, 143-44). This politicization of identity forms loyalties and divides 
communities. Once the violence reaches a certain intensity and the nationalist incitement convinces the 
majority of the group to believe that the other group does not consider violence against the civilian 
population of their communities as criminal, they cannot accept any arrangement which would impose 
any power on them by the other group that proposes partition as a solution. Given the usually high degree 
                                                 
2 His results demonstrate that in eight out of the nine cases of successful partition he researched, the largest stay-
behind minority represented less than 10 percent of the total population. The post-partition territorial intermingling 
is measured as the size of the largest minority in the two rump states in percentage relative to the total population 
of the state (Pischedda 2008, 112-13). 
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of violence that makes the civil population alienated, the prospect to end hostilities is not enough to 
restore trust among groups and to deter the renewing of the conflict. Partition therefore may provide a 
solution to the mistrust as it separates the ethnic groups and effectively terminates the ethnic conflict 
(Johnson 2008, Kaufmann 1996).  
On the basis of these favourable impacts of partition at intra-state level, this thesis will investigate 
the case study of Kosovo secondly by the following criterion: 
(2)  Partition coupled with a high degree of ethnic homogeneity reduces the mistrust between 
ethnic groups leading to less ethnic tension in the new independent country. 
 
The chapter reviewed the core literature on ethnic conflict termination and introduced the main 
arguments. The theoretical framework was organised in a two-level of analysis structure: the inter-state 
and intra-state. This organised the sets of arguments and came up with a two-criterion system to test the 
hypothesis. Each criterion sets its main mechanism to look at while analysing the partition’s effect on 
the ethnic tension. The thesis shall turn to the methodological part in the next section. 
  
 
3. Methodology 
Having introduced the comprehensive literature of conflict resolution and the theoretical framework on 
partition, this following section describes the methods and the main indicators that will be used to 
implement my research and to explain the success of partition on ethnic tension for supporting my 
theoretical propositions and for justifying my case study. 
 
3.1.Methods  
Van Evera (1997, 55) proposes five main aspects of a case study, namely “testing theories, creating 
theories, identifying antecedent conditions, testing the importance of these antecedent conditions, and 
explaining cases of intrinsic importance”. The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the above 
mentioned aspects and to test their feasibility in the case of Kosovo. There are more potential ways to 
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conduct a case study, however, this thesis uses the method of process tracing and tests the theories with 
observations within the case of Kosovo. While investigating the chains of events and the causal relations 
between partition and ethnic tension, this study aims to find support for the main criteria laid down in 
the theoretical framework (Van Evera 1997, 74-5). Furthermore, by applying process tracing in the case 
study of Kosovo the thesis tests the propositions of the theory on partition. Finally, the empirical part 
assesses whether and to what extent these results correlate with the propositions and the hypothesis (Van 
Evera 1997, 56). 
This thesis is based on a qualitative research method and is carried out by means of documentary 
research on the relevant secondary literature such as that from the field of ethnic conflict, international 
security, and conflict management and resolution. Since both the case of Kosovo and the resolution 
methods of ethnic conflicts, particularly partition, are generally well-researched topics, they provide a 
proper basis for my research and testing my hypothesis. Furthermore, the Leiden University Library’s 
comprehensive selection of literature in the field of ethnic conflicts and conflict resolution, coupled with 
an extensive online catalogue and joint databases such as EBSCO and JSTOR provided proper the 
necessary online and offline resources for my research. I had not only access to the mainstream articles 
of the Western literature, but I could also broaden my research studies reflecting the points of view of 
the Kosovo Albanian and Serbian authors 
Given the need for impartial rough data about the conflict, I also looked at reports and studies of 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that are considered to be representing universal values. 
Additionally, I assessed a number of reports of European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), 
Freedom House, Human Right Watch, International Crises Group, and Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) from the subsequent years of the NATO intervention in 1999 until the 
very recent events to explore the extent of recurrence of violence or any kind of ethnic tension between 
the two ethnic groups. I also studied the report of The Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
that was established to analyse the subsequent events and the consequences of the intervention.3 Finally 
                                                 
3 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo is an inter-state initiative to conduct an independent 
analysis of the Kosovo conflict. The Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson came up with the idea but he received 
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to determine the data of population in terms of ethnicity, religion, and geographical location, I used the 
dataset of the Central Bureau of Statistics of Kosovo. However, I had to use an estimated dataset in 
respect of the number of the population and the ratio of the ethnic groups.  It is difficult to find an 
accurate dataset about the population, i.e. the number of inhabitants and the rates of the ethnic groups 
because the census before the 1998-99 war lacks information about the Albanian population in Kosovo, 
while the 2011 census lacks information on the northern municipalities because of their boycotts. For 
this reason it must be noted that this is an estimation. Moreover, the data set of the casualties, refugees 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) might vary in some articles but I used primary resources to avoid 
biased results. 
The analysis of the case study of Kosovo will provide a ‘strong test’. The outcome will be 
unambiguous since the theory-based hypothesis anticipates that partition has a positive effect on ethnic 
tensions (Van Evera 1997, 31). Although this outcome has its limitations in terms of uniqueness, it 
certainly has value by putting the case of Kosovo into a new context. It also allows for investigation of 
the degree of ethnic tension using a two-level criteria system if we consider the numerous secessionist 
movements or related groups around the world. Kosovo provides an interesting case to investigate the 
success of the partition process since it is still a work in progress. The analysis of historical and recent 
events does not only shed light on their impact on the ethnic tension but these results may also have 
important implications for the future affairs between the conflicting parties.  
 
3.2. Indicators 
To reveal the efficacy of partition as an ethnic conflict resolution method based on the theoretical 
framework, the thesis measures the ethnic tension between the rump and the new state and within the 
newly created country. The main goal is to test the hypothesis and find empirical data in the case of 
Kosovo for the effects of partition on ethnic tension between the conflicting groups. Based on the criteria 
                                                 
an extensive international support, even Kofi Annan, the then United Nations Secretary-General endorsed the 
project. The Commission comprised experts in the field and analysed the available sources (Commission on 
Kosovo 2000, 21). I will refer to the report as “Commission on Kosovo” in the thesis. 
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set up by the theory at inter-state and intra-state levels, the following indicators help to explain the effect 
of partition on ethnic tension by looking at different issues. 
The effect of partition on the ethnic tension at inter-state level is considered by assessing the status 
of the borders between Serbia and Kosovo and the level of separation of the ethnic groups. The status 
of the borders will concern the historical, geographical, and legal borders and the improvements as a 
result of the partition. This thesis will analyse the level of separation by the territorial position of the 
areas of Kosovo where Serbs form the majority, and the conditions for the return of refugees of the war 
and internally displaced persons. 
In terms of indicators at intra-state level, this thesis will investigate the correlation between ethnic 
heterogeneity and ethnic mistrust in the post-partition state. In this context, with the high degree of 
homogeneity closely related to the lesser need for cooperation between the ethnic groups, this thesis 
looks at the competency of the parallel institutions in their extension on the everyday life of the ethnic 
minorities. The other aspect of homogeneity is assessed the by the correlation between the ethnic 
hostility and ethnic heterogeneity. This will be determined by the number of ethnic crimes and minority 
participation. 
 
3.3. The case of Kosovo 
The case of Kosovo provides an excellent choice for assessing the impact of partition due to the 
extensive data at disposal. A large volume of books, articles and reports have been published as a result 
of historical, mythological, analytical and empirical researches. This comprehensive literature discusses 
numerous aspects of the case enabling me to use the most relevant ones. It must be also noted, however, 
that the case of Kosovo is an ongoing and hotly debated issue. Nevertheless, the reader might find this 
study interesting incorporating past events and the latest findings on the topic.  
The choice of Kosovo also provides an illustrative case if one consider its numerous distinctive 
features: the long-standing atrocities and ethnic discrimination strengthened the intention of the Kosovo 
Albanians to secede from Yugoslavia/Serbia, while the 1998-99 war and the subsequent NATO-UN 
intervention imposed a de facto separation for the area.  The de facto partition of Kosovo in 1999, 
however, did not properly separate the population (Judah 2008, 92). Although roughly half of the 
20 
 
Serbian community fled after the war to avoid revenge, a significant minority remained in the territory, 
mainly in the North of the Ibar/Ibër River (See Map I). Recent events suggest that the Serbian minority 
may be willing to integrate into an independent Kosovo if their demands are satisfied with the 
implementation of the April Agreement (Rossi 2014, 880). However, this is outside the scope and 
timeline of my study and would need further research as soon as it comes into effect. 
Another limitation of the universal applicability of this case study relates to the issue of precedence.  
Not only did Kosovo Albanians emphasises the uniqueness of their case in their declaration of 
independence but the US representative before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) also underpinned 
this logic with three set of elements: the circumstances of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the human 
rights crises within Kosovo, and the United Nations intervention on behalf of Kosovo (Ker-Lindsay 
2013, 847). Even though those states that recognised Kosovo claimed that this case has a unique set of 
conditions and such as not a precedent for recognition of other secessionist movements, but this 
argumentation was contested by noting that each case has its own distinctive characteristics (Wolff and 
Peen Rodt 2013, 806). 
Nevertheless, the case of Kosovo should demonstrate proper findings for the propositions of 
partition advocates. This thesis shall continue further by revealing the relevant events of the historical 
background of the case study in terms of ethnic tension. 
 
 
4. Historical background of the ethnic tension 
To understand the tension between the Serbian and Albanian communities, the Serbian insistence that 
Kosovo remain part of Serbia, and the impact the partition had on the relations between the ethnic 
groups, the roots of the ethnic conflict are firstly introduced. Furthermore, it assesses the relevant aspects 
of their relations until the NATO intervention in 1999.  
The myth of Kosovo and the particular importance of the territory for the Serbs arguably date back 
to the 14th century. Serbs attribute a unique importance to the Battle of Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosova of 
1389 when Serbian nobles were defeated by the Ottoman Empire and the former feudal state became a 
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vassal state (Judah 2008, 20). Despite the fact that the historical surrender was not a pleasant national 
triumph, the subsequent folk ballads created a heroic frame for the Serbian leader, Lazar, who died at 
Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosova in preference to living as a vassal. The glorified mythology of this story 
and the heroism of the ancestors have become the most important source of the national pride of bravery 
and loyalty for the subsequent centuries (Cohen 2014, 1-6). 
More than five centuries later the Ottoman Empire lost power over the territory as a result of the 
Balkan Wars in 1912-13. The subsequent periods have seen the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes in 1918, which was renamed as Yugoslavia in 1929 (Judah 2008, 41). With tremendous 
cultural traditions, Yugoslavia embraced uneven economic development and different national identities 
led to centralisation of the state power in the hands of the Serbian nationality (Toal and Dahlman 2011, 
24). The creation of Albania in 1912 provided an extra impetus to Kosovo Albanians to migrate from 
Kosovo. In addition, Serbs were encouraged by special economic privileges to move into the province 
of Kosovo which attracted more than 70,000 Serb colonisers (Hoxhaj 2005; 13, Nikolić 2003, 57). The 
government launched forced expulsion and killings against Albanians in order to ensure the dominance 
of the Serbian community in the territory. The forceful incorporation of Kosovo was part of the Serbian 
objective to become a strong regional power in the Balkans (Cohen 2014, 19; Daskalovski 2003, 17).  
After the Second World War, the fights between the Serb nationalistic group of Chetniks and the 
multi-ethnic, communist-led Partisans of Josip Broz Tito ended up with the emergence of Tito guerrilla 
army. Further violent actions were carried out by the Communist “brotherhood” against former members 
of the Serbian and Croatian nationalistic groups, Germans, and political enemies who were perceived to 
be a threat to Tito’s rule similar to the separatist initiative of Kosovo Albanians (Toal and Dahlman 
2011, 27). To decrease the nationalist aspirations in Yugoslavia in 1945, Tito divided the country into 
six nominally sovereign republics along their historical borderlines corrected at some places by taking 
into account the ethnic equality: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and 
Slovenia. While the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija were declared as a “constituent part” 
of Republic of Serbia, they were only entitled to some autonomy but not the right to secede as the 
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republics (Commission on Kosovo 2000, 34; Nikolić 2003, 59).4 The borders were fixed at that time; 
the northern part of the territory inhabited by Serbians was added to this province as a compensation for 
Serbia detaching two municipalities for their North-South railway route from the south-eastern part of 
the territory (Judah 2008, 52-3).  
The late 1960s and 1970s had seen an “Albanization” taking place at every level of the Kosovo 
Albanians’ life (Judah 2008, 53). Although Kosovo Albanians earned higher levels of autonomy in the 
1974 Constitution, they still considered it as a failure as it did not grant a nation status for them. Their 
aim was to get the status and rights equal to other republics not having independence at that time (Cohen 
2014; Hoxhaj 2005, 15). In the subsequent period of Tito’s death in 1980, a new political leadership 
emerged who replied to the political demands and protests with arrests and repression. Despite the huge 
amount of federal funds Kosovo received for modernisation and to assist with the economic 
development, several secessionist groups were formed demanding the republic status (Judah 2008, 58; 
Nikolić 2003, 60). The Yugoslavian military brutally suppressed the demonstrations of the Albanian 
community and several civilians were arrested and imprisoned which further fed the polarisation 
between the two ethnic groups (Commission on Kosovo 2000, 37). However, the Serbian and 
Montenegrin population of Kosovo was also harassed and this population complained about ideological 
discrimination and fear of physical violence during the 1980s. It is estimated that around half of them 
emigrated or were forced to leave the province (Nikolić 2003, 61). Some Serbian historians however, 
alleged a much higher rate of emigration (Daskalovski 2003, 15). 
Yugoslavian governments attempted to expel the Kosovo Albanians from the province to the 
neighbouring countries several times to change the demographic balance in favour of the Serbian 
community.5 The Serbian government encouraged the Serb population to move into Kosovo by 
                                                 
4 The Constitution classified three categories: nations with their own republics, nationalities with concentrated 
parts inside the Federation whereas their homeland was in the region, and national minorities. The two provinces 
were considered as nationalities. The central power gradually devolved more and more authority to regional level. 
The 1945 Constitution only created the six republics while the following three constitutions in 1953, 1963, 1974 
further increased the decentralisation of power. Some claim that Yugoslavia was deemed to fail because of its 
structure of governance and not as a consequence of its geographical and geopolitical diversity (Toal and Dahlman 
2011, 28-9). 
5 The 1981 census results showed that the 77.5% of the population was Albanians while 13% was Serbs (as reported 
in Guzina 2003, 33). Since the Albanian population boycotted the next census in 1991 there are only estimated 
data about the proportions of ethnic groups. In case of the same trend during the 1980s the number of the Albanian 
population increased to 82% and the Serb decreased to 10% (Judah 2008, 2). 
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providing free parcels and advantageous loans in the 1990s to counterbalance the rapidly growing 
Albanian population and the high rate of Serb emigration. Slobodan Milošević imposed a series of 
restrictions on Albanians that created a system referred to by some as “ethnic apartheid” (Hoxhaj 2005, 
15; Walling 2000, 60). In 1990 the Serbian government declared a first state of emergency over Kosovo, 
and as part of subsequent measures the usage of the Albanian language was banned, schools and 
universities were closed, and family planning programs were imposed. Kosovo Albanians were arguably 
discriminated in all spheres of life (Commission on Kosovo 2000, 41-2; Guzina 2003, 36; Nikolić 2003, 
61).  
The religious bonds have always been another aspect of the tension between the communities. The 
population is divided by the religion, Kosovo Albanians mainly are Muslims while Kosovo Serbs belong 
to the Serb Orthodox Church (See Map II). It used to distinguish the population but it only became an 
issue when Serbian nationalism began to focus on the Kosovo legend and the distinct character of the 
traitor Muslim compared to the loyal and brave Serbian soldiers. Serb nationalist leaders such as 
Milošević used the rhetoric of political demagogy to strengthen the bond to Kosovo by emphasising the 
role of the territory as a “Holy Land” in the Serbian history (Cohen 2014, 19-24). The annual celebration 
of the Battle of Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosova, the St. Virtus’s Day became a symbol of the liberation of 
the Serbian homeland from foreign powers. The wave of Serb nationalism peaked on the 600th 
anniversary of the Battle in 1989 attracting millions of Serbs from all over Yugoslavia and the World 
(Daskalovski 2003, 15). Milošević made a rousing speech encouraging the national pride in people and 
emphasising the unity, solidarity and cooperation that Kosovo symbolised to Yugoslavia. In one of his 
earlier speeches he even envisaged, that in case of Kosovo was lost, the whole of Yugoslavia would 
break up (Cohen 2014, 27; Judah 2008, 66).  
1990 has seen elections of historical significance in the republics of Yugoslavia followed by 
referendums on independence. Firstly, the declaration of independence in 1991 by the two republics of 
Slovenia and Croatia was commonly considered to be the starting point of the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
Whereas the conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo are generally referred to as the second wave of secession 
(Toal and Dahlman 2011, 34). The former Yugoslavs insist, however, that the fatal events started from 
Kosovo in 1989 when Milošević revoked the autonomy of the province resulting in demonstrations in 
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Kosovo and the rise of nationalism elsewhere in the Federation (Judah 2008, 61; Nikolić 2003, 61). 
Nevertheless, the armed violence started in 1991 in Slovenia and spilled over to Croatia and to Bosnia 
for the period between 1992 and 1995 (Gagnon 1995, 159-64). Having seen the secessionist movements 
of the republics of Yugoslavia, Kosovar people demanded independence, since their previous desire to 
gain the status of republic within Yugoslavia was no longer feasible (Hoxhaj 2005, 15). As a result, 
Kosovo Albanians declared their independence in 1991 by their president, Ibrahim Rugova who led the 
Democratic League of Kosovo. This organisation constituted the basis of the peaceful resistance and 
primarily worked on building up the parallel institutions in Kosovo (Nenadović 2010, 1160).6 On the 
one hand, the intention of this parallel system was to deny the Serbian legitimacy and supremacy by 
boycotting the elections and by covering all sphere of public life such as education, health care, culture 
and printed media. On the other hand, the ultimate goal was to raise attention of the international 
community to the situation in Kosovo (Daskalovski 2003, 15). 
The Kosovo Liberation Army was created in 1993 as a symbol of resistance and the fight for 
independence of the Kosovo Albanians (Judah 2008, 77). However, they mostly resorted to guerrilla 
warfare in order to attract international attention for their ethnic claims. The violence deteriorated after 
Kosovo was excluded from the Dayton Peace Accord that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1995. Despite the partition, it established a multi-ethnic federative system with extensive privileges for 
the Bosnian Serbs that envisaged for Kosovo only a status as the constituent part of Yugoslavia (Guzina 
2003, 41; Walling 2000, 62).  
The last few years of the 1990s had witnessed the rise of ethnic tension. The attacks of armed ethnic 
Albanian groups and the counterattacks of the Serbian forces directed against civilians and the 
Yugoslavian police forces lead to high number of casualties and refugees (Nikolić 2003, 62). The 
UNHCR reported that the 1998-1999 war resulted the death toll of around 11,000 people, the expulsion 
of 848,100 Kosovo Albanians to the neighbouring countries and the fleeing of roughly 180,000 Kosovo 
Serbs and Roma to Serbia (Del Mundo and Wilkinson 1999, 11). In fact, Western diplomats attempted 
to propose a deal in Rambouillet before the intervention, but the parties failed to agree on the details 
                                                 
6 The government was based in Bonn and the Kosovo Albanians supported it financially in form of ‘voluntary’ 
taxes (Commission on Kosovo 2000, 46; Judah 2008, 73-4). 
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(Judah 2008, 84-7).7 It was as late as 1999 when the international community intervened by air strikes. 
Although the NATO attacks stopped the systematic killings and oppression of Kosovo Albanians and 
led to the Serbian military withdrawal, it also created an environment of insecurity for the Serb 
population and Albanians who were loyal to Yugoslavia (Nikolić 2003, 64). The crisis ended with the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that established and tasked the UNMIK to create a democratic 
self-administration system with relevant autonomy until the final status of Kosovo would be settled 
(UNSCR 1244, 1999). It implied a “physical, political, and economic separation” between Kosovo and 
the rest of the Federation de facto partitioning Kosovo but legally Kosovo still constituted a part of 
Serbia (Commission on Kosovo 2000, 100). The war over Kosovo marked the end of the violent 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, the UNSC Resolution 1244 did not end the territorial disputes 
in Kosovo since it was explained differently by the Kosovo Albanians and Serbia. Kosovo Albanians 
interpreted it as an approval of their subsequent unilateral declaration of independence in contrast to 
Serbia who believes it confirms their territorial sovereignty over Kosovo (Burema 2013, 9). 
 
 
5. The effect of partition on ethnic tension 
5.1. Analysis at inter-state level 
This section will assess the first set of arguments of partition-advocates that suggest that a decrease of 
violence between the conflicting parties in the presence of defensible borders and properly separated 
ethnic groups. It will measure two indicators, the status of the borders and the level of separation of the 
ethnic groups, to investigate the effect of the partition on the relations between Serbia and Kosovo at 
inter-state level. Firstly, the status of borders will be considered from historical, geographical and legal 
perspectives. Secondly, the level of separation will be determined by assessing the territorial position of 
the areas of Kosovo where Serbs form the majority, and the conditions for the return of refugees of the 
                                                 
7 The deal proposed a three-year period with NATO-led security forces in the province that would have been an 
autonomous part of Serbia, while the Yugoslav forces could have stayed on the borders only. Serbia opposed the 
NATO presence and the too extensive autonomy for Kosovo Albanians, while the Kosovo delegation rejected for 
not granting them independence. Despite it was never stated explicitly, the international community decided to 
intervene on humanitarian basis as a result of the high number of casualties. They intended to prevent a massacre 
as it happened earlier in Bosnia (Judah 2008, 84-5). 
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war and internally displaced persons. These findings will indicate the degree of ethnic tension among 
the Kosovo Albanians and Serbian communities. 
5.1.1. The status of borders and recognition of Kosovo  
Historically, the borders of Kosovo date back to the end of the Second World War and were finalised 
by the 1948 border closure towards Albania due to the Soviet-Yugoslav split. Geographically, it includes 
two regions of Kosovo and Metohija: the eastern, northern part of the province and the western 
mountains constitute Kosovo while the central-southern plain is called Metohija by the Serbs call it 
(Judah 2008, 31). Legally, Serbia had rejected the independence of Kosovo from the very moment that 
the UNMIK started to operate in the territory and Serbian passports are still required from those people 
from Kosovo who wants to travel through Serbia. The current borders correspond with those of the 
former autonomous province within Yugoslavia (Judah 2008, 100-1). 
The recognition of Kosovo is another important issue in assessing the status of the borders. The 
Serbian leadership and the vast majority of the Serbian population have rejected it since 1999 when the 
UNMIK started its operation in the territory. The strong resistance and this non-recognition policy by 
Serbia remained in place in the post-Milošević era, from 2000 until recent developments in 2011. As a 
result, a new constitution was ratified in 2006 that declared Kosovo and Metohija as an integral part of 
Serbia (Radeljić 2014, 247). The Ahtisaari Plan, a status settlement proposal in 2007-08 covering a wide 
range of issues apart from the status of Kosovo however, did not consider the reintegration of the 
territory into Serbia as a viable option, referring to the long years since the separation (Perritt 2010, 164-
66). While the Kosovo Assembly approved the plan, the Serbian leadership strongly opposed it. Both 
the Serbian President Tadić and Prime Minister Koštunica rejected the proposal claiming that they would 
never support the “creation of a “false state” on the sovereign territory of Serbia” (Perritt 2010, 217). 
As a result of the Russian support for Serbia and the veto in the UN Security Council the proposal failed 
and the status of the borders remained unsolved.  
The Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 also triggered public resistance in Serbia. Its 
citizens tend to feel that there is double standard regarding Kosovo and the issue of its recognition. The 
subsequent actions by the Serbian government strengthened this position: the stand by the government 
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to not cooperate with the EULEX or other officials of the “fake” state, and the order for the 
municipalities to boycott the local authority elections (Judah 2008, 146). There have been also signs, 
however, in the direction of easing tensions and a possible recognition of Kosovo in the future. The 
Serbian government for instance cut the financial support for the parallel institutions previously 
established in the Kosovo area and stopped the repayment of foreign debts for Kosovo in 2009 although 
these measures had previously symbolised that Serbians still had authority over the territory. Kosovo 
also acceded to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and started to pay off its own debt to the World 
Bank that year (Helsinki Committee 2009, 4). Moreover, the political developments during 2013-14 
arguably strengthen the chance of eventual recognition and resolution for the status of borders. The EU-
facilitated dialogue for example between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbian authorities led to an 
agreement in April 2013 that requires both countries to recognise the other’s right to access to the 
European Union (Clark 2013, 541).8 
Taken together, it is clear that the redrawing of international boundaries has been efficient in easing 
the ethnic tension and lowering the likelihood of the reescalation of the violence. Without doubt, the 
ethnic tension between the two communities around 1999 envisaged that a multi-ethnic Kosovo was 
bound to fail. The Serbian and Albanian communities were clearly no longer able to live together in one 
country after the NATO intervention in 1999. The presence of international forces, such as the UNMIK 
and EULEX missions, arguably increased the costs of aggression for either side, while defensible 
borders also prevented the parties from resorting to high-scale violence. Although the recognition of 
Kosovo by the Serbian authorities is still incomplete, the new inter-state borders have created defense 
lines for separating the conflicting ethnic parties. 
 
                                                 
8 This is not to say that Serbia is recognised Kosovo as an independent state, as the EU did not required from the 
country, however once they properly implement the agreement it could be the first step towards the normalisation 
of their relations (Deda and Qosaj-Mustafa 2013, 13). Moreover, the EU does not require from its candidates or 
member states to recognise Kosovo but demands a normal relation with neighbour states. Even though the 
international community underlined that this case is unique five EU member state would not recognise it, namely 
Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain because of their own territorial issues (Cohen 2014, 220). 
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5.1.2. The level of separation at inter-state level 
The level of separation will be considered at inter-state level by assessing the population changes and 
the subsequent developments following the NATO intervention in 1999. As partition-advocates argue, 
the proper separation of ethnic groups into sovereign states may lead to decreased level of violence and 
avoid future territorial disputes. It does so by separating the hostile population, the different ethnic 
communities and the minority groups. Otherwise, the failure of or incomplete ethnic separation may 
create stay-behind minorities in the territory of both newly emerging states and may enhance incentives 
for ethnic cleansing (Downes 2004; Johnson 2008). As many advocate, this can only be prevented by 
planned population transfers (Downes 2001, 63; Tullberg and Tullberg 1997).   
To understand the importance of separating the two ethnic groups after the NATO intervention, one 
must first look at the casualties of the war itself and its consequence on the population. The armed 
conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbia lasted from February 1998 to June 
1999. During the first phase of the crisis, numbers of casualties were relatively low whereas the extent 
of the atrocities were much more intense and the death toll more worrying in the period between March 
and June 1999. The Office of the UNHCR estimates the number of killings during the entire period at 
around 11,000, with the vast majority of the victims being Kosovo Albanians (Del Mundo and 
Wilkinson 1999, 11). Also approximately 863,000 civilians were forced to leave the province and sought 
refugee status outside Kosovo and an additional 590,000 people were internally displaced (Commission 
on Kosovo 2000, 2). By the end of the war, around 1.5 million people, i.e. 90% of the population of 
Kosovo, had been expelled from their homes (NATO 1999). There is also evidence for the massacre of 
people and wide spread arrests and detentions (Commission on Kosovo 2000, 2). Moreover, there is an 
ongoing debate as to the issue of mass graves and the exact number of still missing people that is 
estimated around 1,655 (EULEX 2014). Without doubt, the separation of the two ethnic groups 
following the armed conflict was of utmost importance to avoid revenge, ethnic cleansing and other 
atrocities. 
The process of separation has had widespread consequences for the ethnic division in the territory. 
More than half of the Serb and Roma population, nearly 180,000 people, left Kosovo to flee into Serbia 
together with the departing Serbian military forces, and only around 100,000 people remained 
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(Commission on Kosovo 2000, 7). On the other hand, more than 600,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees 
who had left the province into the neighbouring countries, returned with the escort of the Kosovo Forces 
(KFOR), the NATO-led international peacekeeping force (Del Mundo and Wilkinson 1999, 11). 
Although partition is considered by some to be “an ugly formula for ending war” dividing communities 
and violating human rights to force groups of people to leave their properties behind, in Kosovo it 
prevented the deterioration of the situation. Ethnic separation and a kind of people exchange were 
necessary conditions (Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1999; Mearsheimer 2000, 137). Undoubtedly, a high 
scale of return by the Kosovo Albanian refugees who fled from Kosovo during the war to a multi-ethnic 
state or to a province that belongs to Serbia is not likely as they would have been exposed to possible 
cleansing incentives or other constraints by the majority group (Downes 2004, 250; Mearsheimer and 
Van Evera 1999). 
Nonetheless, there are still unresolved issues and challenges as regards the voluntary return process 
and the resolution of conflict-related property claims. The fact is that only a limited number of refugees 
and IDPs have been willing to return voluntarily due to the inadequate conditions and the fear of 
discrimination and insecurity (Human Rights Watch 2014, 5). A recent report by the OSCE Mission in 
Kosovo concludes that approximately 220,000 people are still displaced outside Kosovo and around 
17,300 people within Kosovo without viable resolution for their return or integration at the place of 
displacement (OSCE 2014, 6). Compared to the 13,000 people who were displaced from their homes as 
a direct consequence of the 1998-99 war, the number of the IDPs had increased by 4,300 in the first half 
of 2014 as a result of the 2004 riots. This number represents a 55% - 40% ratio of Serb-Albanian ethnic 
groups (Norwegian Refugee Council 2014, 2). Housing and property restitution is another concern for 
refugees and displaced persons, in particular for Kosovo’s non-Albanian communities as they constitute 
the majority of the claimants. Community leaders have used these conflict-related properties for keeping 
the ethnic balance within the territories, for instance by claiming abandoned buildings as communal 
further reducing the options for the refugees who return (International Crisis Group 2011, 12). 
Addressing the needs of the effected people and providing a remedy for conflict-related property claims 
will be crucial, however, in order to relieve tensions in Kosovo. 
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Notwithstanding these limitations, these findings suggest the largely positive impact of the partition 
on the relations between Serbia and Kosovo at inter-state level. The defensible borders that can be 
considered as de facto and recognised by the Serb authorities, coupled with a broadly implemented 
separation process indicate that the ethnic tension among the Kosovo Albanian and Serbian communities 
has decreased to a great extent during the last fifteen years. Partition has also avoided the recurrence of 
high scale violence, and the tragic events and mass atrocities during the 1998-99 war. The war and the 
high-scale violence did not reoccur but Serbia incited and supported the parallel institutions for years 
rather than recognise the authority of the interim international protectorate-supported Kosovo 
institutions. Nonetheless, recent political developments, such as the EU-facilitated dialogue between 
Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština, clearly indicate the greater normalisation of relations between the rump 
and the new state at inter-state level. 
 
5.2. Analysis at intra-state level 
This chapter assesses the second set of arguments of partition which are advocate that encompass the 
analysis of the effect of partition on ethnic tension within the newly created state. This dimension refers 
to the correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic mistrust in a post-partition state. After a brief 
overview of the relevant theoretical framework, this section will first introduce the territorial position 
of the districts with Serbian majority. It will then consider the division among these Serbian provinces 
and their relevance to the level of cooperation among the Serbian community and Kosovo Albanians. 
The assumption here is that a high degree of homogeneity decreases the need for cooperation and 
significantly reduces the incentives for further violence. The issue of the newly established parallel 
institutions will also be critically examined in view of their effects on the life of the new minority group, 
the Serb ethnicity, and the need for cooperation with the Kosovo state institutions. The second objective 
of this chapter is to investigate whether ethnic hostility correlates with ethnic heterogeneity. An 
assessment of the presence and frequency of ethnically-motivated crimes during the last fifteen years 
between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbian communities will test this assumption. Furthermore, the 
issue of minority participation will shed light on the level of progress as regards the integrity of Kosovo. 
The central question to address in this section however, will be whether the high degree of separation 
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and ethnic homogeneity eases the mistrust between the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian communities and 
provides a relatively secure environment for both of them in the new independent country. 
The effect of partition on ethnic tension at intra-state level will be first tested by an assessment of 
the level of homogeneity. As explained earlier, the concept of security dilemma suggests that the more 
heterogeneous the population is, the more opportunities for attacks are. Partition followed by proper 
ethnic separation is therefore the only viable solution not only for reducing the security threat but also 
for preventing further large-scale violent actions. For at least an interim period, it also abolishes the need 
to cooperate and to trust in the other conflicting party (Kaufmann 1996; Posen 1993). Ethnic separation 
with a high degree of territorial heterogeneity within the new state is likely to increase ethnic hatred as 
the degree of hostility is the most extensive where the population is the least separated. It can be 
concluded that even partition may fail to prevent the recurrence of conflicts in the case of ethnically 
mixed territory. It must be also noted, however, that creating defensible enclaves for minority groups 
within the new state may also help to avoid the need for cooperation if they have extensive local 
autonomy that represents the interest of the minority group (Downes 2004; Kaufmann 1996, 137). 
Furthermore, the territorial arrangements of ethnic separation are other factors for assessing the effects 
of partition. As discussed previously, the newly created enclaves of the minority groups must be small 
and militarily weak, otherwise their existence provides incentives for ethnic cleansing or irredentism. 
Similarly, geographic concentration near disputed borders is more likely to spark conflict because of the 
irredentist opportunity (Kaufmann 1996, 162-63). Finally, it is also clear that partition cannot completely 
rule out the chance of warfare and does not necessarily guarantee peace. It can decrease the violence by 
reducing the need for cooperation and the fear for group survival but not by accomplishing the perfect 
homogeneity within the new country (Pischedda 2008, 110; Johnson 2008, 160-61). 
If we consider the territorial position of those areas where the Serbian communities constitute the 
majority, Kosovo provides a prime example to assess these assumptions, in particular the level of 
homogeneity. According to the most recent data, the main line of separation between the Serbian and 
Kosovo Albanian communities is still along the Ibar/Ibër River, setting apart the city of 
Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and dividing the other three northern municipalities from the rest of the country 
where Kosovo Albanians form the majority. Apart from these northern municipalities: 
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Leposavić/Leposaviq, Mitrovica/Mitrovicë, Zvećan/Zveçan, and Zubin Potok, there are also six 
sporadic Serb enclaves out of 38 municipalities in the rest of the country. These Serb enclaves include 
Štrpce/Shtrpcë in the South and Gračanica/Graçanicë in the central-eastern part of the country where 
Serbian communities are in majority (see Map I). This new administrative division of Kosovo was 
adopted on the basis of the status settlement provisions by the Ahtisaari Plan that envisaged ethnically 
homogeneous administrative districts (Burema 2012, 12; Rossi 2014, 879). The latest, 2011 Kosovo 
population census estimates that the Albanian majority comprise 92% of the population of around 1.8 
million people, while Kosovo Serbs constitute only around 5%. The census also reports that one-third 
of the Kosovo Serbs live in the northern municipalities and two-third of them reside sporadically in the 
Southern enclaves (Clark 2013, 527).9 This chapter demonstrates that it is this incomplete separation of 
the two ethnic groups, particularly the northern provinces geographically concentrated near the disputed 
borders between Kosovo and Serbia which tend to drive the feeling of insecurity and the occasional 
outbreaks of violence (Rossi 2014, 876). 
The main dividing line where ethnic tension seems to be hardened in the post-partition period is 
therefore that which separate the three northern districts from the rest of the country and those that divide 
the city of Mitrovica/Mitrovicë. To illustrate the scale of division between the two ethnic groups, two 
points can be mentioned. Firstly, there is still a lookout point at the bridge across the Ibar/Ibër River for 
the paramilitary Serb group, “Bridge-watchers” who guard the bridge from any suspicious Albanian 
activities (Judah 2008, 101). Another sign of the division is that locals from the northern districts are 
limited in their freedom of movement in the absence Kosovo identity cards. Northern Serb locals 
consider, however, that issuing these identity cards would be equal to recognising the independence of 
Kosovo. Moreover, unfortunately there are also reports about the perception that “interethnic contact is 
undesirable as there is too much bad blood between the two groups” (Clark 2013, 533-36). 
 
                                                 
9 The Kosovo Population and Houses Census 2011 provides a wealth of information, however, only a rough 
estimation due to the exclusion of northern Kosovo and the partial boycott by Serb and Roma communities in the 
southern districts. These numbers thus are an estimation of previous data on 2008 and 2009 total population and 
number of housing units of these areas (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2013, 7). 
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5.2.1. The division among the districts with Serbian majority 
The extensive local autonomy and the parallel institutions of the northern districts that were established 
after the partition are the first elements of the division. Sustaining parallel administrative structures have 
made it possible for Serbian communities to avoid cooperating with Kosovo institutions since they can 
solely rely on these establishments in terms of financial and administrative support (Hoxhaj 2005, 23-
6). The parallel administrative structures located in these territories also provide justice, education, 
health care and postal systems. The division is even obvious in practical issues such as currency, vehicle 
number plates, the language regime, telephone networks and so on. It is also worth mentioning, that the 
financial support of the Serbian government in this regard contributes to higher salaries for the workers 
which can be considered a convincing factor to stay in this territory (Judah 2008, 101-3). On the one 
hand, this distinct political establishment arguably eased the ethnic tension between the conflicting 
parties by lessening the need for Serbian minority groups to cooperate with Kosovo state institutions. 
On the other hand, the very existence of these parallel administrative structures demonstrates the 
mistrust by locals for the state institutions despite the substantial and wide-ranging rights that the 
Constitution provides them (Freedom House 2008). 
In contrast, the situation of the Serbian communities in the southern enclaves illustrates that small 
and militarily weak districts far from disputed borders are less likely to provide incentives for 
irredentism and to spark ethnic conflicts. Moreover, not only these provinces are located far from the 
Serbia-Kosovo border but they tend to accept the presence and authority of the Kosovo state institutions, 
suggesting the chance for peaceful co-existence of Serbian and Kosovo Albanians (Burema 2012, 12). 
Not surprisingly though, the dependence of these southern enclaves on the Kosovo state institutions is 
much higher compared to the northern districts. In fact, no parallel administrative structures have been 
established in these areas. All these developments have resulted in the realization by local Serbian 
communities that the independence of Kosovo is unavoidable (International Crisis Group 2012, 3-4). In 
general, therefore, this awareness seems to strengthen their peaceful and pragmatic engagement with the 
Kosovo state institutions and their willingness to participate in the reconciliation process between the 
conflicting parties.  
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The second element of the division among the northern and southern Serb enclaves refers to the 
presence of ethnic tension. The scale of ethnically-motivated violence has largely decreased during the 
last fifteen years. The ethnic riots in 2004 were however, considerable and demonstrate the correlation 
between ethnic hostility and ethnic heterogeneity. The rampage that started in 17 March 2004 with 
shooting of a Serb man by an Albanian radical resulted in nineteen dead, approximately 900 injured of 
which most were Serbian minorities. Furthermore nearly 4,500 people were displaced along with 
damage to or destruction of 30 Serbian churches and two monasteries (International Crisis Group 2004, 
1). Despite the lack of proof found for ethically-motivated killings during the subsequent investigation, 
the dramatic and violent events of March 2004 were clearly a serious setback to the four and a half years 
gradual progress in Kosovo on becoming a tolerant multi-ethnic society. Furthermore these riots 
tragically caused great damage to the relations between the two ethnic groups (Clark 2013, 530). The 
different interpretations of the events well illustrate this worrying development, while Serbs tend to refer 
to the unrest as a pre-planned and organised pogrom and ethnic cleansing of them by extremists, the 
Kosovo Albanians regard it as a righteous protest by both moderate and extremist Albanians 
(International Crisis Group 2004, 15). Nonetheless, apart from the period of unrest in March 2004, the 
overall severity and frequency of ethnically-motivated violence have significantly and permanently 
decreased. Despite some inconsistencies between the statistics of the different organisations, results 
indicate that the proportion of ethnically-motivated crimes is decreased of all crimes (UNMIK 2006, 8; 
Kosovo Police 2013). Further analysis revealed that the higher proportion of the crimes have been 
motivated by property theft and opportunism and not by ethnic hatred. The main focus of the EULEX-
supported Kosovo Police is on organised crime such as human trafficking and smuggling (Kosovo Police 
2013, 5).  
The declaration of independence in 2008 and the Belgrade-Prishtinë/Priština Agreement of 2013 
also further demonstrated the division among the northern and southern Serb provinces and the different 
approaches as regards an independent Kosovo. The 2008 unrest followed Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence on 17 February 2008 when Kosovo Serbs opposed to the partition by boycotting the 
central government in Prishtinë/Priština. Tensions even intensified in the northern districts where Serbs 
did not only attempt to seize infrastructure and border posts but also attacked international institutions, 
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leaving one UN policeman dead. In the end, UN forces had to prevent Serb protesters from crossing the 
bridge over the Ibar/Ibër River to the southern districts with Albanian communities (Perritt 2010, 219). 
This unrest demonstrated again that Mitrovica/Mitrovicë, the ethnically-divided city, is a flashpoint for 
violence in Kosovo. Similarly, ethnic tension increased and large demonstrations were held in the 
northern provinces following the adoption of the April Agreement in 2013.10 The division between 
southern and northern Serb communities was clearly notable in this case. Surveys showed that the 
majority of the locals of the northern districts clearly opposed the agreement facilitated by the EU while 
the residents of the southern municipalities supported it (Deda and Qosaj-Mustafa 2013, 5). 
Overall, these results suggest that partition, coupled with ethnic separation has led to an increasingly 
secure environment for all Kosovo citizens, belonging to the Albanian, Serbian or Roma communities. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that ethnic hostility correlates with ethnic heterogeneity. The localisation 
of the highly violent events demonstrate that ethnically-intermixed territories are more exposed, as it 
was the case during the 2004 March unrest when the two focal points were North-Mitrovica/Mitrovicë 
and Čaglavica/Çagllavicë, both with a relatively high proportion of minority groups. Furthermore, 
incentives for irredentism are considerably stronger in the northern parts if we consider the frequent use 
of the Serbian flags and slogans at the large-scale demonstrations. In contrast, the more homogeneous 
areas are less likely to face violent events, further supporting the perception that where the population 
is least separated, the degree of hostility is higher. These assumptions have been widely verified in the 
case of the Southern areas: minority groups in this region tend to accept the presence and influence of 
the Kosovo state institutions. Also their resistance against the declaration of independence has been 
much less and their involvement in the major ethnically-motivated criminal events has been much 
smaller than their counterparts in the northern provinces. 
 
                                                 
10 The April Agreement entails the Serb recognition about the Kosovar authority over majority-Serb areas which 
would mean to weaken, then eventually diminish the parallel institutions in the northern municipalities in a 
transparent and cooperative manner. In return Kosovo conceded more autonomy to the northern Serb minority to 
form an umbrella organisation, the Association/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities to represent their local 
interests in areas as economic development, education, health, and urban and rural planning (Freedom House 2014; 
Rossi 2014, 878-80).  
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5.2.2. Ethnic separation in light of minority participation in elections 
The aim of this section is to briefly assess the level of minority participation in general and municipal 
elections. Although not strictly related to the theoretical framework of the effect of partition, the 
minority participation in elections sheds light on the status of ethnic tension between the Kosovo 
Albanians and Serb communities and provides important findings for this research. 
It is undeniable that the effective political participation of minority communities is central to the 
proper functioning of a multi-ethnic society. It helps to provide a forum for representing the diverse 
interests of different communities in order to be given proper consideration in political decision-making. 
Special institutional arrangements have been therefore established in Kosovo after the partition in order 
to promote minority involvement in the public sphere. Fifteen years after the NATO intervention and 
the international assistance in Kosovo, the integration of the Serb minorities into the political processes 
still seems to be tense. However, there has been remarkable progress on this if we consider the ethnic 
tension rooted in the relations between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbians. 
Based on the provisions of the Kosovo Constitution and Law on Self-Government in Kosovo, 
community participation via the legislative framework of Kosovo is assured through guaranteed 
representation at all levels of the government and by the right to form political parties. In the Kosovo 
Assembly, the Serb community has a mandate of ten seats guaranteed, and five representatives in the 
Community Consultative Council whereas at northern municipalities Serbs also have competencies in 
areas such as health, education and cultural affairs (Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 64; Law on Self-
Government in Kosovo 2008, Article 12.6). 
In spite of these provisions, the Serb communities have been long reluctant to participate in the 
general and municipal elections. In the last few elections however, a steady increase in terms of turn out 
and willingness to vote has been observed. A difference between the Serb communities in southern and 
northern Kosovo can also be noticed here. Before 2010, there had been a collective boycott by the 
Serbian minorities to participate on elections (Nenadović 2010, 1161). Despite calls for a boycott by the 
Serbian government, the Serb community residing in the southern districts cautiously participated while 
northern provinces completely boycotted the 2009 municipal and 2010 general elections (European 
Centre for Minority Issues 2013, 20). The 2013 municipal elections, however, has seen the first country-
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wide elections. Although the division within the Serb community remained and a handful of people still 
perceived the participation as equal to the recognition of the independence of Kosovo, the turnout 
increased in both areas. In the southern districts it was even higher than the Kosovo average of around 
47% whereas in northern Kosovo it was approximately 20% (Kosovo Central Election Commission, 
2013). Without doubt, these elections were relevant at an intra-state level since they have provided the 
first opportunities for the Serb communities in the northern municipalities to elect their local 
representatives. They also indicate the slow but steady progress in terms of willingness for minority 
participation in political life. 
Overall, this section has shown the relationship between ethnically homogeneity and ethnic hostility. 
It has indicated that ethnic tension is likely to decrease at intra-state level in the case of proper ethnic 
separation while the findings have also found evidence for increased ethnic hatred in areas with high 
degree of ethnic heterogeneity. In practical terms, the last fifteen years in Kosovo imply that the sporadic 
southern enclaves of the Serbian community have been much more willing to accept the Kosovo state 
authority over them and to participate in general and municipal elections. In contrast, the northern 
provinces largely resided by Kosovo Serbians with extensive autonomy have been also illustrative if we 
consider the perception that a heterogeneous state is not able to prevent ethnic violence and it forces the 
cooperation of otherwise conflicting parties. The unrests in 2004 and 2008 have demonstrated how a 
hostile environment may evolve into dramatic and violent events. Notwithstanding these limitations, 
this chapter concludes that partition has been effective in providing a relatively secure environment for 
all citizens, in easing the level of mistrust between the Kosovo Albanian and Serbian communities and 
even in assuring the possibility for minority participation in elections. 
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6. Conclusion 
The main goal of the present study was to determine the efficacy of partition as a conflict 
resolution method. It did so by discussing the case of Kosovo following its de facto separation 
from Serbia after the NATO intervention in 1999. It proposed that partition is a solution to 
ethnic conflicts and likely to decrease ethnic tension between the conflicting parties. As an 
essential starting element of strengthening the validity of the findings, this thesis has first 
explored the main theoretical assumptions as regards the likely effects of partition on ethnic 
tension. It has then set up a two-level criteria system to test the hypothesis of this thesis that 
assess whether partition decreases ethnic tension between the conflicting ethnic groups between the 
rump and the new state, and within the new state. It has been suggested that the establishment of 
new defensible borders and the proper separation of ethnic groups into sovereign states 
decreases the level of ethnically-motivated violence at inter-state level. At intra-state level, the 
high degree of homogeneity was considered to reduce the mistrust between ethnic groups within 
the new state. Besides, this study has unveiled the relevant aspects of the historical background 
up to the 1998-99 war and explained the roots of the ethnic conflict between the Serbian and 
Albanian communities. On the basis of this assessment, this study has then investigated the 
effect of partition on the relations between Serbia and Kosovo by looking at the status of borders 
from historical, geographical and legal perspectives. The level of separation has been 
determined by the features and territorial position of those areas where Serb communities form 
the majority. Moreover, the analysis of the degree of homogeneity and the major ethnically-
motivated crises within the new state have suggested a correlation between ethnic heterogeneity 
and ethnic mistrust. Consequently, it could be concluded that partition is indeed an efficient in 
terminating and preventing the recurrence of conflicts in the case of ethnically mixed territory. 
Several major conclusions can be drawn from this study. One of the most significant ones 
is that partition has generally led to a decreased level of ethnic tension between Serbia and 
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Kosovo. The investigation into the status of the borders has shown evidence for the reduced 
likelihood of reescalation of violence between the belligerent ethnic groups. Before partition, 
mistrust was very high due to the 1998-99 war and the nationalistic policy of the Serbian 
leadership. Arguably, the tragic events of the war and the high level of refugees and internally 
displaced persons highlighted the need for terminating the conflict in order to avoid an even 
more severe and extensive ethnic cleansing. The international community stopped the 
proliferation of ethnic killings however, with its intervention on humanitarian grounds and 
imposed a protectorate on the territory, de facto partitioning the province of Kosovo from 
Serbia. Given the fact that Serbia still questions the legitimacy of the intervention and has not 
yet recognised the independence of Kosovo, the status of the borders are still not settled but 
there are clear signs of progress in the relation between the two former belligerents. In addition, 
separating the two ethnic groups has avoided the violent revenge and further ethnic cleansings. 
It ensured the return of some of those Kosovo Albanian refugees who had fled the country as a 
direct consequence of the 1998-99 war and who would have arguably not returned to a Serb-
dominated country because of the fear of a possible revival of cleansing incentives. Taken 
together, it can be concluded that the relation between Serbia and Kosovo at inter-state level 
has experienced lower level of violence as a result of the partition. The study has therefore 
found empirical evidence for the positive effects of partition in reducing ethnic tension between 
the conflicting groups by the redrawing international borders. 
The second major finding relates to the impact of partition as an ethnic conflict resolution 
method at the inter-state level. The main proposition in this context implied that the high degree 
of homogeneity does not only reduce the need for cooperation but also significantly lessens the 
fear for survival of the minority groups. The assessment of the territorial position of those newly 
created provinces where Serbian minorities form the majority, demonstrates that the incomplete 
separation of the ethnic groups, especially the division by the Ibar/Ibër River, is likely to lead 
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to sporadic outbreaks of violence. The feeling of insecurity and mistrust towards the majority 
Albanians by the local Serbian communities has also manifested in the creation of parallel 
administrative structures that cover the basic social system needs. Furthermore, the occurrence 
of much violence in the post-partition era demonstrates that ethnically intermixed territories 
face much higher level of ethnic tension compared to territories where proper ethnic separation 
took place. As has been discussed previously, the major ethnic riots and demonstrations have 
taken place at the divided city of Mitorvica/Mitrovicë while southern Serb enclaves have 
witnessed much less ethnic hostility. The fact that the latter districts meet the conditions of 
being small and weak enought not to promote cleansing initiatives whereas the northern 
municipalities are located near the Serbia-Kosovo borders supports the theoretical expectation 
of partition advocates regarding this matter. This finding also clearly enhances the assumption 
that ethnic heterogeneity correlates with ethnic mistrust. The gradual acceptance of the southern 
Serb enclaves to participate in the general and municipal elections and all spheres of life in an 
independent Kosovo also underpin this logic. In general, therefore, these developments suggest 
the moderate but consistent progress in the relations between the previously hostile ethnic 
groups and in their willingness to cooperate. These findings underline the relevance of proper 
ethnic separation and demonstrate the suitability and usefulness of partition as a policy response 
to ethnic civil wars. 
The conclusions of this study have a number of practical implications. First, the case of 
Kosovo demonstrates the desirability of reaching a negotiated partition settlement. The process 
of territorial adjustment and boundary revision arguably represents an appropriate way forward 
in certain circumstances. It also highlights that mere changes in sovereignty are insufficient to 
produce peaceful and viable outcomes. One might say that partition may not always be a good 
solution in all cases. Partition is however without doubt a practical solution that helps ensure 
safety and stability and also the prospect of future cooperation. Secondly, the issue of northern 
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Kosovo needs to be addressed properly. Although finding a solution for this problem which 
would satisfy both parties in the conflict is extremely difficult, it is of utmost importance in 
order to aid the completion of partition and to further ease ethnic tensions in the region. Thirdly, 
the case of Kosovo may or may not offer a precedent for other ethnic conflicts. The significance 
and relevance of this question is undeniable if we consider, for instance, the Russia-Georgia 
war in 2008 or the recent events in Crimea. Given the spectre of self-determination that these 
events have raised, as one of the most contested political phenomenon of our time, the legal 
context and international norms for partition will also need to be settled. Although it seems that 
the case of Kosovo is a good one for effective partition, but only history can tell if that will 
remain so.  
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Appendices 
 
Map I – Ethnic or cultural background: Albanian, Serbian, Turkish 
 
Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2013, 34 
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Map II – Religion: Islamic and Orthodox 
 
 
Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2013, 38 
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